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ABSTRACT
We investigate the relationship between audit committee characteristics, board diversity, 
and the propensity of committing fraud among Malaysian firms. Based on a matched-pair 
sample of 64 observations for the years 2002–2014, we find limited evidence to suggest 
that audit committee characteristics matters. However, we find a negative relationship 
between the percentage of female directors and the likelihood of fraud. Results highlight 
the importance of the audit committee (in) effectiveness and the relative importance of 
female directors in Malaysia. Our results are robust when we consider a structural change 
in corporate governance policies in Malaysia. 
Keywords: fraudulent financial reporting (FFR), audit committee, corporate governance, 
independence, expertise
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INTRODUCTION
Fraudulent financial reporting (FFR) has received considerable attention in recent 
years. According to Vlad et al. (2011), fraudulent financial statements can pose 
serious threats such as the erosion of public confidence, particularly investors’ 
confidence in the reliability of the financial information reported. They also 
emphasised that FFR undermines the reliability, quality, transparency, and 
integrity of financial reporting. Extant literature finds that fraudulent financial 
reporting is associated with weak corporate governance (Beasley 1996; Beasley 
et al., 1999; Dechow et al., 1996; Dunn, 2004; Persons, 2006). Farber (2005) finds 
that fraud firms have poor governance as illustrated by fewer number and a lower 
percentage of external members in the board of directors, fewer audit committee 
meetings, fewer financial experts on the audit committees, a smaller percentage 
engaging Big 4 auditing firms, and a higher percentage of chief executive officer 
(CEO) duality. Corporate governance encompasses practices and procedures to 
ensure that a company is managed in such a way that it achieves its objectives. 
The purpose of corporate governance is to facilitate effective, entrepreneurial, 
and prudent management that can lead to the long-term success of the company 
(Council, Financial Reporting, 2012). Thus, any practices that lead to inefficiency 
of corporate governance practices are described as poor corporate governance and 
is expected to lead to corporate failure such as FFR. The term “poor corporate 
governance” has been covered extensively in prior research works of corporate 
governance such as Cornelius (2005), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), and 
Hoechle et al. (2012). Despite the findings, little is known whether these corporate 
governance characteristics hold the potential to mitigate FFR especially in 
developing countries such as Malaysia, which have different institutional settings 
from developed countries like the United States. 
Hasnan et al. (2013) provide the initial evidence on FFR in Malaysia, in which 
they find that firms engaging in fraudulent activities have a high level of earnings 
management prior to committing fraud. Hasnan et al. (2014) suggest that firms 
might involve in fraudulent activities because of accounting failure and poor 
corporate governance. Md Nasir et al. (2018) then extend Hasnan et al.’s (2013; 
2014) research by examining whether these firms engage in either real or accruals 
earnings management prior to committing fraud. Based on a sample of 65 fraud 
and non-fraud firms, they found fraud firms engaging in manipulating production 
costs. We extend these papers in several ways. First, we focus on audit committee 
characteristics (expertise, meetings, and tenure), and board diversity (female 
directors), in relation to FFR. We focus on audit committee characteristics as 
audit committee plays more direct role in monitoring the board of directors (Xie 
et al., 2003) and thus have more influence on the information content of earnings 
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(Anderson et al., 2003). Unlike the above-mentioned studies; our data cover a 
more extended period (2002–2014), which gives a better scope in understanding 
the role of these governance factors. 
This study takes advantage of the increasing role of women in boardrooms in 
Malaysia on FFR. On 27 June 2011, the then Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Najib 
Tun Razak announced that the Malaysian cabinet had approved a policy whereby 
corporate firms in the private sector must achieve at least 30% representation of 
women in decision-making positions. Following the announcement, Securities 
Commission Malaysia (SC) and Bursa Malaysia have taken an initiative to 
promote diversity and inclusiveness.1 A subsequent announcement made by the 
government on 15 September 2011 drew attention to as the government is studying 
the proposal on how to boost women’s participation in the corporate sector. Thus, 
the investigation on the role of women in audit committee as well as board of 
directors is timely and has policy implications. 
After controlling for other governance variables and institutional setting variables in 
Malaysia, we find limited evidence that audit committee characteristics can reduce 
the likelihood of fraud. Contrary to expectations, independent audit committee 
members are positively associated with FFR, while grey audit committee members 
are negatively associated with FFR, warranting further and thorough investigation 
on the audit committees in Malaysia. The relationship between the percentage 
of women on the board of directors and FFR results in a negative relationship, 
highlighting the vital role of women in boardrooms. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Audit Committee Composition 
Several empirical studies have shown that boards composed of external directors 
who are mainly independent are more effective in their monitoring role. Previous 
studies (Dechow et al., 1996, Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2000; Xie et al., 2003) 
indicate that the independence of audit committee is more efficient in constraining 
earnings management, and thus, have lower earnings manipulation. Other 
studies (Beasley, 1996; Farber, 2005) have also shown that an independent audit 
committee is less likely to commit fraud. Abbott et al. (2000) state that external 
audit committee directors play two crucial roles in demanding financial reporting 
quality, which is the preservation of auditors’ reputation in enhancing financial 
reporting quality and mitigating shareholder lawsuits against financial statements 
fraud. 
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Despite the evidence on the monitoring role of external directors, there is little 
evidence found on the different impact of solely independent and grey directors 
since past studies treating these distinct group as homogenous (Wan Hussin, 
2009). An independent director is an external director who has no affiliation with 
the firm other than being on the board of directors, whereas non-independent 
directors are external directors who have some non-board affiliation with the firm 
(Beasley 1996). Felo and Solieri (2009) state that directors can be classified as 
grey for various reasons such as family relationship, formerly worked for the firm, 
or business relationship with the firm.
Raghunandan et al. (2001) find that audit committees can only perform better if 
the audit committee is comprised solely of independent directors and with at least 
one member having an accounting or finance background. Their result is also 
supported by Mustafa and Youssef (2010), which find that an independent audit 
committee member is only useful in reducing the occurrence of misappropriation 
of assets if he or she is also a financial expert. 
Alternatively, from the resource dependency perspective, grey directors could 
play an important role in advising as they involve in strategic business decision 
making through their affiliations with the firm. Hsu and Wu (2014) stress that the 
effectiveness of grey directors is rooted in the collaborative board model in which 
the collaborative working relationships among its members are enabling to reinforce 
strategic board function through the flow of information in the boardroom. Their 
result supports that firms with a large proportion of grey directors on their boards 
are less likely to fail. Their result is consistent with previous studies which find 
that grey directors enhance disclosure quality (Felo & Solieri, 2009) and corporate 
transparency (Wan Hussin, 2009). Based on the ambiguous relationship on audit 
committee composition, we predict the following non-directional hypothesis, 
stated in the alternative form:   
H1a: There is a relationship between the percentage of independent audit 
committee and the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting
H1b: There is a relationship between the percentage of grey audit committee 
and the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting
Audit Committee Expertise 
He et al. (2009) state that having at least one financial expert in the audit committee 
enables the augmentation of the committee’s effectiveness since financial experts 
are required to lead the committee in identifying and raising knowledgeable 
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questions that can challenge the management. An expert audit committee member 
can assist external auditors in negotiating and challenging management in relation 
to accounting estimates, judgments, and applications of accounting principles 
(Deli & Gillan, 2000; DeZoort & Salterio, 2001). Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2008) argue that an audit committee with financial accounting expertise can 
enhance conservatism since they can help firms to assess justifications given by 
the management as they have experience-based and well-developed frameworks 
to measure account’s conservatism.
Farber (2005) and Abbott et al. (2004) supported the notion that financial expertise 
is an important characteristic of an audit committee in controlling managers’ 
behaviours by showing that financial expertise possessed by audit committees 
can strengthen monitoring and oversight roles of audit committees in the financial 
reporting process. Previous studies (Krishnan, 2005; Zhang et al., 2007; Lo et al., 
2010) also verified that audit committee expertise could help firms to constrain 
management’s opportunistic behaviour, as they understand the complexities of 
financial reporting presented by the management. 
In contrast, He et al. (2009) argue that even though an expert audit committee 
is expected to ask knowledgeable questions that can challenge the management, 
such ability may not require expertise. It was found that people with no formal 
training either in accounting or finance can be as insightful (or even more) as those 
with formal training, maybe because they have practical management experience 
(Association for Investment Management and Research, 1999). 
The effects of audit committee expertise on the quality of financial reporting 
produce mixed results. Previous studies have documented that audit committee 
expertise can enhance earnings conservatism (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008), 
reduce fraudulent reporting of financial statements (Abbott et al., 2004; Farber, 
2005), is less likely to be associated with incidences of internal control problems 
(Krishnan, 2005; Zhang et al., 2007), less likely to engage in transfer pricing 
manipulations (Lo et al., 2010), reduce aggressive earnings management (Carcello 
et al., 2006), and reduce misappropriation of assets (Mustafa & Meier, 2006; 
Chapple et al., 2009). 
On the other hand, Xie et al. (2003) find that the percentage of external legal and 
financial members of an audit committee is unrelated to the current discretionary 
accruals. Similarly, Carcello and Neal (2003) find that different expertise presents 
different impacts on financial reporting quality and managerial influence plays a 
vital role in influencing the use of their expertise. Based on the above-mentioned 
arguments, we posit a non-directional hypothesis, stated in the alternative form: 
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H2: There is a relationship between the percentage of audit committee 
members with financial accounting expertise and the likelihood of 
fraudulent financial reporting 
Audit committee meetings
The frequency of audit committee meetings is a measure of the demand for 
monitoring a firm’s financial reporting process (Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006; 
Engel et al., 2010) and is believed to be translated into higher financial reporting 
transparency. Audit committee meetings are viewed as an important element by the 
creditors in their relationship with the firms (Anderson et al., 2004). The 1999 Blue 
Ribbon Committee (BRC) report, likewise, advocates that audit committees can 
best assure the quality of the financial statements by having at least four meetings 
a year (Morrissey, 2000). Zhang et al. (2007) state that firms need additional 
meetings in order to solve problems such as internal control weaknesses. Abbott et 
al. (2004) and Anderson et al. (2004) state that meeting frequency may indirectly 
provide information on how active and valuable audit committee monitoring is and 
the committee’s diligence in carrying out their responsibilities. 
Abbott et al. (2004) find that firms are more likely to appoint industry-specialist 
auditors if independent audit committees meet at least twice a year. Beasley et al. 
(2000) find that the audit committees of fraudulent firms meet less often relative 
to non-fraud firms. Abbott et al. (2004) find that the number of audit meetings is 
negatively associated with the frequency of accounting restatements. Anderson 
et al. (2004) showed that meetings frequency is associated with lower costs of debt 
financing, lower yield spreads, and is associated with the types of auditor change 
made by the company. Therefore, this study posits that:
H3: There is a relationship between the number of audit committee 
meetings and fraudulent financial reporting
Board Diversity
The recent proposals of governance reforms on the importance of gender diversity 
have been raised to highlight the difference between men and women in many 
terms including personality, communication style, educational background, 
and career experience as has been stressed by previous researches (Buss, 2005; 
Feingold, 1994). Francis et al. (2015) point out that female chief financial officers 
(CFOs) are more sensitive to various types of risk than male CFOs. Thus, women 
are generally more risk-averse than men (Eckel & Grossman, 2008; Croson & 
Gneezy, 2009). Huang and Kisgen (2013) find that female CFOs are less likely 
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to make a significant number of acquisitions. Nevertheless, when they do make 
acquisitions, they exhibit higher announcement returns compared to those made 
by firms with male CFOs. Huang and Kisgen (2013) also find that female CFOs 
are less likely to issue debt and are more likely to reduce the debt ratio than male 
CFOs. 
Nevertheless, the prejudices against women still play around the mind and influence 
the mentality of others with the perception that women are more problematic due 
to conditions such as maternity breaks and household responsibilities. Hiring 
women will mean hiring more cost as firms need to provide more infrastructure 
and more flexible working policy to support women’s working condition. Previous 
researchers find mixed results on gender diversity. Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
find that female board members improve corporate governance but decrease 
firm performance. Dyreng et al. (2010) do not find that executive gender affects 
corporate tax avoidance. Ge et al. (2011) do not find that CFO gender affects 
discretionary accruals. Some studies show that female directors may play an 
insignificant role in environmental matters due to sex-based biases (Galbreath, 
2011; Rodriguez-Dominguez et al., 2009). Ferreira (2010) notes that firms gain 
social benefits in promoting women to the board. Women’s presence increases 
accountability and improves communication between the board and stakeholders. 
In other words, it increases non-financial measures such as customer satisfaction, 
gender representation and corporate social responsibility (Terjesen et al., 2009). 
Despite mixed evidence, this study believes that the presence of women on board 
will eventually contribute to better firm performance and the firm’s survival. 
Therefore, this study posits that:
H4: There is a negative relationship between female directors on the board 
and the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting 
RESEARCH METHOD
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable used in the analysis is FFR, which takes the value of 1 if 
the firm commits FFR, zero otherwise. This variable is identified from the SC’s 
website. Since FFR is defined as intentional misrepresentation of a firm’s financial 
statements with the aim to give investors a mistaken impression about the firm’s 
operating performance and profitability, the firms included as samples are those 
that commit FFR such as submitting misleading statement to Bursa Malaysia 
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Securities Berhad, submission of false statements and/or information in prospectus 
(s.55 of the Securities Commission Act), and submission of false information in 
Annual Report (s.122B of the Securities Industries Act). 
Independent and Control Variables
The independent variables used in this study are audit committee characteristics 
which are the composition of the audit committee, audit committee expertise, 
and audit committees’ number of meetings. This study included several control 
variables. These control variables are included in order to capitalise on several 
regulatory changes in Malaysia, and these variables are expected to play a 
significant role in influencing FFR. Some financial and institutional variables are 
also included. We include financial variables total debt-to-total asset (DEBT) and 
total asset (SIZE) to represent debt and firm size. For institutional variables, we 
include political connection (POLCON) and family connection (FAMILY) to 
represent Malaysia’s institutional setting. The influence and dominance of family 
presence and ownership in Malaysia have been well documented (Claessens & 
Fan, 2002; Jaggi et al., 2009). Capital control from family dominance and political 
connections in Malaysia’s economy has led to an increase in cronyism (Johnson & 
Mitton, 2003) and thus are expected to influence  FFR. Hasnan and Hussain (2015) 
quoted that corporate ownership in East Asian countries is concentrated in large 
controlling shareholders, specifically, the family and the individual. Krishnan and 
Peytcheva (2019) find that auditors assess the risk of fraud as higher for family 
firms as compared to non-family firms. Previous research has indicated that debt 
(Persons, 2006) and political connection (Hasnan et al., 2013) are among the 
important factors to be associated with FFR. All independent and control variables 
are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1
Operational definitions
Variables Symbol Operationalisation
Dependent variable
The propensity of fraudulent 
financial reporting
FFR A dummy variable coded 1 if the firm issued 
fraudulent financial reporting, and 0 otherwise
Independent variables
Audit committee independence AC_IND Percentage of independent audit committee
AC_GREY Percentage of non-independent non-executive/
grey audit committee
Audit committee expertise AC_ACCT Percentage of audit committee with financial 
accounting expertise
(continued on next page)
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Variables Symbol Operationalisation
AC_FIN Percentage of the audit committee with 
financial expertise
AC_
NONFIN
Percentage of the audit committee with non- 
financial expertise
Audit committee meeting AC_MEET Number of audit committee meetings
Board gender BOD_
WOMEN
Percentage of women on board of directors 
Audit committee gender AC_MALE Percentage of male audit committee 
Control variables
Board duality DUALITY A dummy variable with a value of 1 when the 
chairman of the board of directors is the CEO 
or president of a company in the prior year to 
the occurrence of FFR
Audit committee tenure AC_
TENURE
Number of tenure of independent directors 
in audit committee divided by the number of 
independent directors in the audit committee
D_AC_
TENURE
A dummy variable equal to 1 if total tenures of 
independent audit committee equal to nine or 
less than nine years
Audit committee directorships AC_MULTI Number of directorships of independent 
directors in audit committee divided  by the 
number of independent directors in the audit 
committee
D_AC_
MULTI
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the total 
number of directorships of the independent 
audit committee is equal to five or less than 
five
Political connection POLCON A dummy variable; coded as 1 if the firms have 
political connection and 0 otherwise.
Family connection FAMILY A dummy variable ; coded as 1 if one of the 
directors have family connection
Debt DEBT Total debt to total asset
Firm size SIZE Total asset
Research Model 
In order to analyse the association between our test variables and FFR, we use the 
following cross-sectional logistic regression model:
Table 1: (continued)
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FFRit = β0 + β1 Audit Committee Compositioni(t–1) + β2 Audit Committee Expertisei(t–1) 
+ β3 Audit Committee Meetingsi(t–1) + Women(t–1) +β5Control variablesi(t–1) + ε
In order to test each hypothesis discussed above, we run the logit model using 
several sub-samples based on three different criteria which are audit committee 
composition, audit committee expertise, and audit committee meetings. The 
models are further discussed in the analysis of results.
Sample Selection 
This study utilises a sample of firms identified by the SC for fraudulent financial 
reporting between 2002 and 2014. The samples selected for this study consist 
of 51 fraud firms listed in the SC enforcement release. However, 12 firms were 
excluded due to the unavailability of data. One company is excluded due to the 
firm’s delisting, and three firms were excluded since the firms have been admitted 
to the MESDAQ market. Finally, three firms are excluded because we were unable 
to locate matching firms. Therefore, the final sample consists of 32 fraud firms 
identified by the SC for fraudulent financial reporting.2 This 32 fraud firms then 
are matched with 32 non-fraud firms which brings the total samples to 64 firms. 
Each of the sample firms was then matched with non-fraud control firms based on 
two criteria, which are size as measured by total assets and industry effects. Fraud 
firms are matched with non-fraud firms within 20% of its size, and they are in the 
same industry if there is more than one matching firm for each firm; thus, the firm 
with the closest size is selected (Jia et al., 2009). 
Data Description
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables 
for the whole sample. Overall, the result indicates that an average 75% of the audit 
committee consists of non-executive directors, with 65% solely independent, and 
10% are grey directors. The result indicates that there are several firms, which are 
still appointing executive directors as part of their audit committee’s composition. 
Audit committees, which are purely accounting expertise, is only 34%. Only 
36% of the audit committee are financially literate, while the remaining are non-
financial literate. The result indicates that in average the sample does not comply 
with the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG), which emphasises 
that all members of audit committees should be financially literate and at least one 
should be a member of an accounting association or body. The average number 
of meetings conducted by the firms is 4. This is consistent with what has been 
suggested that audit committees can best assure the quality of financial statements 
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by having at least four meetings a year (Morrissey, 2000). In terms of gender, 93% 
of the audit committee are male, which means that women only represent 7% of 
the audit committee. Meanwhile, only 9% of the board of directors are women. 
In terms of new MCCG 2012 requirement which are board duality and tenure, the 
result indicates that in the prior year to the occurrence of FFR, 21.9% of the firms 
have the chairman of the board of directors who are also the CEO or president 
of the firms. The mean tenure for the sample of this study is 64 months, which is 
equal to about 5 years tenure. Nevertheless, the maximum tenure for this sample 
is 275 months, which is equal to about 23 years. In terms of MCCG requirement 
for the tenure to be less than 9, only 48% of the firms’ audit committee has a total 
tenure equal to or less than nine years. The average directorships for the sample are 
2 directorships, and the maximum directorships are 8. About 65% of the firms their 
audit committee have multiple directorships less than 5. In terms of Malaysia’s 
institutional setting, 26.6% of the sample comprises of politically connected firms, 
and 51.6% are family connected. The result supports that Malaysia is among the 
countries in Asia that has high percentage of family connection among the listed 
firms (Jaggi et al., 2009). The means for total asset log and debt to total asset 
(DTA) are 19.026 and 1.099, respectively. 
Table 2
Descriptive statistics (n = 64)
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. dev.
Panel A: Main Variables 
AC_IND 65.444 66.670 100.000 25.000 15.645
AC_GREY 9.974 0.000 66.670 0.000 17.247
AC_ACCT 34.375 33.333 75.000 0.000 19.833
AC_FIN 36.327 33.330 100.000 0.000 21.014
AC_NONFIN 64.324 66.670 100.000 0.000 21.176
AC_MEET 4.328 5.000 7.000 0.000 1.624
BOD_WOMEN 0.090 0.000 0.900 0.000 0.194
AC_MALE 0.931 1.000 1.000 0.333 0.146
Panel B: Control Variables
AC_TENURE 63.758 46.750 274.667 6.000 52.775
AC_MULTI 2.341 2.000 8.667 0.000 1.858
SIZE 19.026 19.041 22.459 16.405 1.158
DEBT 1.099 0.485 18.670 0.010 2.725
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RESULTS 
Multivariate 
Table 3 represents our main logit regression results of the relationship between 
audit committee characteristics and FFR. Models 1, 3, and 5 were conducted 
to test the relationship between audit committee characteristics and fraudulent 
financial reporting by operationalising percentage of independent non-executive 
directors. Meanwhile, models 2, 4, and 6 were for by operationalising percentage 
of grey directors. The independent non-executive and grey directors were run 
using different expertise of audit committees, which are the percentage of audit 
committee with accounting expertise, percentage of audit committee with financial 
literacy and percentage of audit committee with non-financial expertise. The 
result indicates that none of the audit committees’ characteristics which are audit 
committee composition, audit committee expertise, and audit committee meetings 
have significant relationship with fraudulent financial reporting. The result is 
consistent with univariate analysis, which indicates that there is no significant 
difference between fraud and non-fraud firms in terms of these audit committee 
characteristics. 
Nevertheless, we find a significant negative relationship between percentages 
of women in board of directors and political connection with FFR in all the six 
models. The result highlights the important role of women in the board of directors 
in reducing the likelihood of FFR. Thus, H4 is supported. The result in univariate 
analysis indicates that fraud firms have only 5% of women in board of directors 
while non-fraud firms have 13% women in their board of directors. It shows that 
non-fraud firms have taken the initiative in line with the announcement made 
by the government to boost women’s presence in the workforce. The result also 
highlights the advantages of having women on board of directors. 
The significant negative relationship between political connection and fraudulent 
financial reporting support the previous studies which argued that the role of 
political connection in a company is not to enhance shareholder value but rather to 
provide preferential treatment as they can provide easier access to funds and, thus, 
firms can easily avoid bankruptcy (Claessens & Fan, 2002, Khwaja & Mian, 2005, 
Faccio, 2006). Secondly, the politically connected firms may use their connections 
to interfere and exploit control over regulatory bodies and, hence, can easily reduce 
oversight over the company in return for bribes and political support. Hasnan 
et al. (2013) asserted that political connection could make FFR more challenging to 
be detected as politicians may use their connections to hide questionable practices 
and avoid regulatory scrutiny.
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The variance inflation factor (VIF) for regressions in Table 3 ranges between 1.607 
and 1.813, suggesting no multicollinearity issue.
Table 3
Main regression
 1 2 3 4 5 6
Variable FFR FFR FFR FFR FFR FFR
Intercept –4.798 –3.400 –3.779 –2.515 –4.228 –3.11
–1.232 –0.926 –0.955 –0.67 –1.179 –0.926
AC_IND 0.018 0.017 0.016
1.631 1.469 1.390
AC_GREY –0.016 –0.016 –0.016
–1.273 –1.260 –1.239
AC_ACCT 0.464 0.31
0.484 0.323
AC_FIN –0.004 –0.005
–0.429 –0.528
AC_NONFIN 0.006 0.007
0.705 0.818
AC_MEET 0.034 0.060 0.044 0.071 0.046 0.074
0.276 0.494 0.362 0.585 0.382 0.637
BOD_WOMEN –2.933* –2.859** –3.263* –3.167 ** –3.358* –3.28**
–1.704 –2.022 –1.710 –1.974 –1.741 –2.017
AC_MALE –0.974 –1.295 –1.409 –1.742 –1.542 –1.865
–0.487 –0.690 –0.676 –0.879 –0.737 –0.945
DUALITY 0.031 –0.082 0.076 –0.042 0.098 –0.017
0.072 –0.187 0.179 –0.097 0.229 –0.039
AC_TENURE –0.002 –0.002 –0.003 –0.002 –0.003 –0.003
–0.730 –0.452 –0.992 –0.687 –1.063 –0.741
AC_MULTI –0.016 –0.003 –0.02 –0.007 –0.019 0.003
–0.158 –0.025 –0.191 –0.069 –0.18 0.102
POLCON –1.082** –0.888** –1.084** –0.902* –1.073** –0.894*
–2.240 –1.957 –2.247 –1.956 –2.224 –1.927
FAMILY –0.194 –0.300 –0.176 –0.284 –0.16 –0.265
–0.520 –0.731 –0.464 –0.686 –0.420 –0.640
(continued on next page)
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 1 2 3 4 5 6
Variable FFR FFR FFR FFR FFR FFR
SIZE 0.241 0.247 0.234 0.241 0.237 0.243
1.360 1.425 1.326 1.402 1.357 1.417
DEBT 0.696* 0.769 0.613* 0.682 0.605 0.681
1.749 1.588 1.649 1.473 1.633 1.491
N 64 64 64 64 64 64
Pseudo R2 0.282 0.277 0.269 0.279 0.245 0.285
LR statistic 22.618** 22.579** 22.586** 22.742** 22.846** 23.083**
Notes: Please refer to Table 1 for operational definitions; *, **, and *** present significant levels at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively 
In order to test the robustness of our result, we try to run all the models again using 
a dummy variable for tenure and directorships. We set the limitation of tenure and 
directorship as the benchmark of the dummy variable in order to test whether new 
requirements made by the government can reduce FFR. We find interesting results, 
as there is a significant positive relationship between the percentage of independent 
audit committee and FFR. In contrast, we find significant negative relationship 
between percentage of grey audit committee and FFR in all the 6 models. 
The result indicates that independent non-executive directors enhance FFR; 
meanwhile, grey directors’ decreases the likelihood of fraudulent financial 
reporting. We offer the following reasons on the inverse relationship. First, the 
direction may indicate that having external directors does not necessarily bring 
positive effect to the firms, as independent directors are not familiar with the 
operation of the firms. Bhagat and Black (2002) find no evidence that firms with 
more independent boards perform better. Instead, they provide evidence that 
there are hints that these firms suffer worse performance than firms with lesser 
independent directors firms. Besides, many independent directors own only a small 
amount of their company’s shares and hence, have limited incentives to monitor 
managers.3 
Table 4
Main regressions with indicator variables
1 2 3 4 5 6
Variable FFR FFR FFR FFR FFR FFR
Intercept –5.358 –3.280 –4.509 –2.570 –4.603 –2.832
Table 3: (continued)
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Variable FFR FFR FFR FFR FFR FFR
–1.427 –0.925 –1.185 –0.709 –1.297 –0.834
AC_IND 0.026** 0.024** 0.024**
2.345 2.220 2.167
AC_GREY –0.021** –0.021** –0.021**
–2.004 –1.997 –1.989
AC_ACCT 0.841 0.612
0.865 0.627
AC_FIN –0.001 –0.002
–0.055 –0.189
AC_NONFIN 0.003 0.005
0.320 0.517
AC_MEET 0.001 0.026 0.012 0.038 0.015 0.042
0.010 0.209 0.096 0.306 0.122 0.334
BOD_WOMEN 0.077 –0.062 0.115 –0.036 0.130 –0.017
0.169 –0.139 0.261 –0.082 0.296 –0.039
AC_MALE –0.151 –0.290 –0.070 –0.217 –0.045 –0.191
–0.371 –0.709 –0.169 –0.519 –0.110 –0.464
DUALITY 0.494 0.297 0.459 0.284 0.447 0.272
1.210 0.743 1.118 0.709 1.083 0.678
D_AC_TENURE –1.115** –0.836* –1.100** –0.835* –1.092** –0.826*
–2.270 –1.784 –2.248 –1.780 –2.239 –1.768
D_AC_MULTI –0.394 –0.468 –0.366 –0.451 –0.351 –0.433
–1.036 –1.168 –0.959 –1.122 –0.913 –1.075
POLCON 0.260 0.275* 0.246 0.265 0.246 0.265
1.488 1.673 1.407 1.611 1.422 1.634
FAMILY 0.747* 0.797* 0.673* 0.729 0.660* 0.716
1.898 1.787 1.708 1.638 1.684 1.612
N 64 64 64 64 64 64
Pseudo R2 0.282 0.277 0.269 0.279 0.245 0.285
LR statistic 24.951** 24.670** 24.338** 24.369** 24.422** 24.559**
Notes: Please refer to Table 1 for operational definitions; *, **, and *** present significant levels at 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. 
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Endogeneity 
Based on corporate governance literature (Lim, 2011), the findings of this study 
may be subject to omitted variables biases resulting from the omission of other 
governance mechanisms that can influence FFR. Therefore, this study adopted 
a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to control for potential endogeneity 
problems. The approach requires the identification and use of an instrument 
(exogenous variable) which has an impact of on the fraudulent financial reporting 
only through audit committee characteristics without any direct influence on 
fraudulent financial reporting. This study uses institutional shareholdings as an 
instrumental variable because it is more likely that institutional shareholdings 
are associated with audit committee characteristics without having direct effect 
on fraudulent financial reporting. Institutional shareholdings can act as pressure-
sensitive investors that can influence the role of the audit committee (Pucheta-
Martinez, 2014). 
We perform the 2SLS regressions and yield statistically similar results. Specifically, 
untabulated statistics for the test are t = –2.000 for BOD_WOMEN, –2.143 for 
POLCON and 2.131 for DEBT. Overall, the results for the 2SLS provide further 
support to the main findings reported in Table 4 and 5. 
Further analyses
We extend our tests by first, running the regression with robust standard errors 
with a non-linear DEBT variable (DEBT2). The robust standard error is to control 
for heteroscedasticity in the regression. Results, as presented in Table 5, remain 
statistically similar to the main regression, suggesting that the earlier results in 
Table 4 is robust. 
Table 5
Main regression with robust standard errors
1 2 3 4 5 6
FFR FFR FFR FFR FFR FFR
INTERCEPT –9.600 –7.315 –7.572 –5.528 –8.195 –6.454
–1.26 –1.04 –0.98 –0.78 –1.19 –1.02
AC_IND 0.032* 0.029 0.027
1.70 1.48 1.36
AC_GREY –0.033 –0.033 –0.032
–1.32 –1.29 –1.26
(continued on next page)
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1 2 3 4 5 6
FFR FFR FFR FFR FFR FFR
AC_FIN –0.005 –0.007
–0.34 –0.44
AC_NONFIN 0.011 0.013
0.74 0.86
AC_ACCT 0.010 0.008
0.58 0.44
AC_MEET 0.084 0.147 0.100 0.163 0.107 0.165
0.38 0.66 0.46 0.74 0.49 0.76
BOD_WOMEN –4.628 –4.577* –5.193 –5.106* –5.453* –5.361*
–1.58 –1.89 –1.63 –1.90 –1.69 –1.95
AC_MALE –0.746 –1.389 –1.533 –2.213 –1.871 –2.604
–0.22 –0.45 –0.42 –0.67 –0.51 –0.78
DUALITY –0.143 –0.371 –0.040 –0.275 0.014 –0.217
–0.18 –0.46 –0.05 –0.36 0.02 –0.28
AC_TENURE –0.004 –0.002 –0.005 –0.004 –0.006 –0.004
–0.67 –0.31 –0.97 –0.59 –1.08 –0.68
AC_MULTI 0.024 0.062 0.011 0.045 0.012 0.045
0.13 0.32 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23
POLCON –1.827* –1.525* –1.805* –1.540* –1.786* –1.517*
–1.94 –1.76 –1.96 –1.75 –1.92 –1.71
FAMILY –0.362 –0.647 –0.320 –0.607 –0.277 –0.560
–0.54 –0.83 –0.47 –0.76 –0.41 –0.71
SIZE 0.352 0.369 0.337 0.358 0.343 0.368
1.06 1.17 1.01 1.13 1.04 1.17
DEBT2 2.840** 3.102* 2.591* 2.836* 2.591* 2.845*
2.11 1.89 1.90 1.78 1.85 1.77
N 64 64 64 64 64 64
Pseudo R2 0.277 0.282 0.274 0.282 0.279 0.287
Notes: Please refer to Table 1 for operational definitions; *, **, and *** present significant levels at 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. 
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Next, we run a separate test for non-politically connected firms, as presented in 
Table 6.4 We find, similar to the previous tests, WOMEN has a negative relationship 
with the propensity of FFR. 
Table 6
Non-politically connected firms
1 2 3 4 5 6
FFR FFR FFR FFR FFR FFR
INTERCEPT –36.217** –25.620** –33.434** –22.939* –32.671** –23.941*
–2.19 –1.99 –2.03 –1.81 –2.09 –1.96
AC_IND 0.072** 0.067** 0.066*
2.16 2.00 1.86
AC_GREY –0.048* –0.049* –0.050*
–1.82 –1.89 –1.82
AC_FIN 0.002 –0.007
0.09 –0.32
AC_NONFIN 0.019 0.023
1.09 1.35
AC_ACCT 0.021 0.011
0.85 0.40
AC_MEET 0.596* 0.559* 0.587* 0.583* 0.579** 0.575**
1.93 1.91 1.92 1.91 1.99 2.01
BOD_WOMEN –13.325* –9.988* –13.514** –10.640* –14.924** –11.740**
–1.83 –1.75 –1.97 –1.89 –2.15 –2.13
AC_MALE –6.398 –5.095 –7.099 –6.130 –8.679 –7.598
–1.06 –0.97 –1.22 –1.19 –1.45 –1.45
DUALITY –0.856 –1.034 –0.724 –0.914 –0.508 –0.735
–0.94 –1.10 –0.81 –1.00 –0.57 –0.81
AC_TENURE –0.014 –0.013 –0.016 –0.016 –0.020* –0.019
–1.29 –0.96 –1.58 –1.20 –1.88 –1.48
AC_MULTI 0.229 0.208 0.193 0.177 0.180 0.170
0.84 0.85 0.72 0.73 0.67 0.72
FAMILY –0.357 –0.765 –0.222 –0.689 0.110 –0.446
–0.43 –0.92 –0.26 –0.81 0.13 –0.53
SIZE 1.716* 1.394* 1.681* 1.364* 1.683* 1.409*
1.71 1.74 1.72 1.74 1.75 1.75
(continued on next page)
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1 2 3 4 5 6
FFR FFR FFR FFR FFR FFR
DEBT2 5.809*** 5.470** 5.314*** 5.031*** 5.076*** 4.925***
3.41 2.50 3.36 2.60 3.28 2.61
N 47 47 47 47 47 47
Pseudo R2 0.434 0.414 0.426 0.413 0.435 0.426
Notes: Please refer to Table 1 for operational definitions; *, **, and *** present significant levels at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
CONCLUSION
Using a sample of 64 fraud and non-fraud firms in Malaysia, we examine 
the association between fraudulent financial reporting and audit committee 
characteristics. Unlike prior studies, we focus on the effects of audit committee 
characteristics on fraud after the establishment of MCCG since 2001. Our analysis 
focuses on examining whether the establishment of the MCCG in 2001 in Malaysia 
has successfully reduced the occurrence of fraud. Based on previous literature, we 
hypothesise that audit committee characteristics such as independence, expertise, 
and activity will reduce the occurrence of fraud highlighting the positive effect 
of MCCG since 2001. This study augmented the role of the audit committee in 
agency theory, which stresses the importance of auditors’ monitoring role in the 
agent-principal relationship. 
We find that there is a positive association between the percentage of independent 
non-executive directors and fraud, suggesting independent directors might be 
ineffective. In contrast, we find a negative relationship between grey directors and 
FFR indicating the important role of inside directors in relative to outside directors. 
The result highlights the possible cosmetic role of independent non-executive 
directors in preventing fraud. The result may also highlight the re-designation of 
independent directors to non-independent; non-executive directors when tenure 
exceeds nine years can add value to the firm as having external directors with some 
inside information, which can help firms decrease the likelihood of FFR. We find 
no association between audit committee expertise and audit committee meeting 
with FFR. 
We find a significant negative association between fraudulent financial reporting 
and the percentage of women on the board. The result indicates that recent regulatory 
changes made by the government to increase women participation in the board 
Table 6: (continued)
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is a right move as there is evidence that women can reduce FFR. Currently, the 
percentage of women in board of directors in Malaysia is still less than 10%, and 
this percentage should be increased up to 30% to help the government to achieve 
their target. Our result also finds significant negative association between FFR 
and political connection. Nevertheless, we suggest that the negative association 
is not to enhance shareholder value but instead treated as preferential treatment in 
term of either fund or power made by political connections towards fraud firms. 
The result also indicates that firms tend to be involved in FFR due to financial 
pressure. Both results provide evidence that economic motives become essential 
determinants for the company to be involved in FFR. 
This study offers significant implications for the establishment of MCCG in 
Malaysia. Regulatory reforms should focus on the development of effective 
teams to monitor the management. Being merely independent is not a guaranteed 
solution for corporate malfeasance and failure. The question is not who monitors 
the management, but rather how to effectively monitor the management. The result 
also indicates that the role assignment of independent directors to non-independent, 
non-executive directors is a right move made by the regulators in Malaysia as the 
firm can capitalise the inside information possess by these directors to reduce FFR.
Our study has at least two significant limitations. First, our sample is small as the 
objective of our study is to investigate the effects of MCCG in mitigating FFR in 
Malaysia. The sample was only taken from 2001 onwards. Second, our samples 
relied on only one source of information which is the SC’s enforcement which was 
released from its website. 
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NOTES
1. For example, Guidance 5.2 of the Malaysian Code for Institutional Investors 2014 
states that these investors should assess the quality of disclosure made by investee 
firms on various diversity targets and policies including gender, age and ethnicity 
(Ramli, 2014).
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2. We would like to note that Hasnan et al. (2013; 2014) only has 52 fraud firms for a 
period of 1997–2007, while Md Nasir has 65 fraud firms from 2001–2008. 
3. We could not rule that the number of the low number of observations could cause the 
change in results. Hence, we suggest an increase in number of observations which is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
4. We could not run for connected firms as the sample size is rather small (n=11).
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